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Abstract. Anthropic reasoning refers to a class of arguments that incorporate the infor-
mation entailed by our own existence to make inferences about the world in which we live.
One prominent example is the Doomsday Argument, which makes predictions about the
future total population of human observers yet to be born based on the ordinal rank of
our birth among humans that have been born so far. A central question in anthropic rea-
soning is from which distribution should we consider ourselves to be randomly sampled.
The Self Sampling Assumption (SSA) states that we should reason as if we’re a random
sample from the set of actual existent observers, while the self indication assumption
(SIA) states that we should reason as if we’re a random sample from among the set of all
possible observers (see [1]). Effectively, SIA weighs the probability of our actual world by
the number of observers relative to SSA. The distinction is important, as SSA supports
the Doomsday Argument, while SIA refutes it. We consider a new thought experiment
called Geometric Incubator and show that SSA implies precognition of coin flips in this
hypothetical world. We consider this to be very strong evidence in favor of SIA over
SSA and against the Doomsday Argument. We use this observation to develop a more
axiomatic mathematical theory of anthropic reasoning. We also introduce an empirical
version of the Doomsday Argument.
1. Introduction: SSA versus SIA
Anthropic reasoning is an umbrella term used to encompass philosophical and physical
arguments that attempt to draw conclusions about the universe using our own existence as
empirical evidence. For example, the Weak Anthropic Principle states that the laws of the
universe have to be consistent with our own existence, while the Strong Anthropic Principle
goes further and asserts that the universe is somehow compelled to have conditions that
support the development of intelligent life, capable of making observations. The first
principle is fairly uncontroversial while the second is the subject of much debate.
A related argument is the Doomsday Argument (DA), which states that we should regard
our birth rank among all humans who have or will have lived as being randomly sampled
from the uniform distribution over such ranks (namely, the set {1 . . . n} where n is the
total population of humans). Gott’s version ([3]) can be summarized as follows: let k be
the number of humans born before us (so that we’re the k + 1-st human. We use this
notation as a standard in this paper). Gott’s Doomsday Argument would conclude, for
example, n < 20k with 95% probability. By modeling the likely future trajectory of human
population, we can then infer a high probability upper bound on the end data for all of
humanity.
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Another version by Leslie ([4], [5]) simply argues that a Bayesian shift in probabilities in
favor of earlier demise of humanity is warranted. While the conclusion is somewhat weaker
and less specific numerically, Leslie takes considerable care to consider the philosophical
assumptions underpinning his argument.
There are two common “assumptions” that have been debated in the philosophical com-
munity to address such questions (they are not so much “assumptions”, but rather /em
proposals on how to properly assign credences to various states of the world). Known as the
“self-sampling assumption” or SSA and the “self-indication assumption” or “SIA”, the dif-
ference focuses on how one should condition on indexical information including knowledge
of one’s birth rank. These two assumptions are usually stated as follows:
• Self Selection Assumption (SSA): All other things equal, an observer should reason
as if they are randomly selected from the set of all actually existent observers (past,
present and future) in their reference class.
• Self Selection Assumption (SIA): All other things equal, an observer should reason
as if they are randomly selected from the set of all possible observers.
As Olum ([6] points out and we explicate below, the Doomsday Argument holds under
SSA, while the probability shift in SIA exactly cancels out Leslie’s probability shift in SIA.
Hence, under SIA, the Doomsday Argument would be considered invalid. As mentioned
above, we argue below that SIA is the only reasonable way to assign credences without
reliance on some sort of supernatural capabilities.
A clear distinction between SSA and SIA is demonstrated by the Incubator thought
experiment ([1]):
Thought Experiment 1 (Incubator). In an otherwise empty world, a machine called
“the incubator” kicks into action. It starts by tossing a fair coin. If the coin falls tails then
it creates one room and a man with a black beard inside it. If the coin falls heads then it
creates two rooms, one with a black-bearded man and one with a white-bearded man. As the
rooms are completely dark, nobody knows his beard color. Everybody who?s been created is
informed about all of the above. You find yourself in one of the rooms.
The basic question is: what credence do you assign to the coin having had landed
heads? In SSA, being born provides no information about the coin flip, as your existence
is compatible with both results of the coin flip. Hence, the credence is 0.5.
In SIA, the answer differs. When we awaken, we consider three possibilities: tails and
we’re the first person, or heads and we’re one of two distinct people. Hence, our credences
at 1/3 for tails and 2/3 for heads.
What is the essential difference between the two? In both, there is a set of objective, inde-
pendent of observer “world-states”, given by the coin flips. We’ll call this set X = {H,T},
with probability distribution P{F = H} = P{F = T} = 0.5. For each world-state, there is
a number of observers N(x) for x ∈ X. In other words, N is a N-valued random variable.
SSA says that the subjective probability distribution on X of an observer emerging from
the incubator remains unchanged, while SIA says the observer should reweigh it by the
number of observers created.
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More generally and formally, we characterize SSA and SIA in the following manner.
Given a probability distribution on the total population of observers N , then SSA and SIA
are methods of computing subjective credences ν(n, k) for a member of the population on
the set of pairs (n, k), where n is the total populations of observers and k is the number
of observers created prior to the creation of that new observer (so that k = 0 for the first
observer and k = n− 1 for the final observer). Let K be the random variable of our birth
index (the number of humans having been born before us). Both SSA and SIA satisfy the
following two properties:
Definiton 1 (Consistency). The credence that K ≥ N is zero. The observer can’t have
been created AFTER all observers have been created.
Definiton 2 (Copernican Principle). For any two natural numbers k0 and k1 less than n,
the credence of (N,K) = (n, k0) and (N,K) = (n, k1) should be the same (no one has any
special, privileged position a priori. We are equally likely to have been created with any
observer’s birth rank).
They do differ in the following way, however: (Note: we are writing probability mass
functions of the discrete random variables N and K as ν(n, k) in these equations for
notational simplicity)
SSA Self sampling assumption. The marginal distribution of N for a newly created
observer is the prior distribution of N . So, for k < n:
νSSA(n, k) =
µ(n)
n
SIA Self indication assumption.The marginal credence of n is the prior distribution n
weighted by the number of obsevers. This is itself a new probability distribution
on X, which we denote µSIA(n). So, for k < n:
νSIA(n, k) =
µSIA(n)
n
µSIA(n) =
n · µ(n)∑∞
m=0m · µ(m)
What arguments are there for and against SSA and SIA? There are many, with the most
crucial argument against SIA being the ”presumptuous philosopher”.
Thought Experiment 2 (Presumptuous Philosopher). It is the year 2100 and physicists
have narrowed down the search for a theory of everything to only two remaining plausible
candidate theories, T1 and T2 (using considerations from super-duper symmetry). Accord-
ing to T1 the world is very, very big but finite, and there are a total of a trillion trillion
observers in the cosmos. According to T2, the world is very, very, very big but finite, and
there are a trillion trillion trillion observers. The super-duper symmetry considerations
seem to be roughly indifferent between these two theories. The physicists are planning on
carrying out a simple experiment that will falsify one of the theories. Enter the presump-
tuous philosopher: ”Hey guys, it is completely unnecessary for you to do the experiment,
because I can already show to you that T2 is about a trillion times more likely to be true
than T1 (whereupon the philosopher explains SIA)!
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Indeed, it seems magical that the presumptuous philosopher could conjure such a result
out of thin air. The methodological supremacy of empirical science, as opposed to armchair
philosophizing, seems to dictate that we need to accept SSA over SIA. However, we prove
below that the reverse is actually the case: it is SSA that enables paradoxical predictions
by armchair philosophizing (a particularly stark example being probabilistic precognition
of the results of coin flips), and SIA that saves us from it. While it is true that SIA would
enable us to draw the conclusion given the narrow and contrived statement of the problem,
there is no paradox as discussed below in Section 5.
2. Geometric Incubator
We begin with a modification of Thought Experiment 1:
Thought Experiment 3 (Geometric Incubator). Suppose in an otherwise empty universe
a machine attached to an incubator flips a possibly biased coin which lands heads with
probability p ∈ (0, 1) and tails with probability 1−p. The coin flips are independent events.
The machine continues flipping coins until a tails appears so that the sequence of flips is
some number – possibly zero – of heads followed by a single tails. After each heads , the
machine runs the incubator, creating a new human being.
Suppose you wake up as an observer in this world and want to make statistical inferences
about the future coin flips and the distribution of n, the total population of humans. In
particular:
(1) What is the probability that the next coin flip is tails?
(2) What is the probability distribution you should assign to (random variable) N , the
number of human beings that will ever be created in this universe?
Let X be the set of all such sequences of flips. As in Incubator above, we think of X
as being the set of “states of the world” for this universe. We can identify X with N by
identifying a sequence of coin flips in X with the number of heads in the sequence.
The one piece of information you gain upon emerging from the incubator is that you
are the K + 1-th human: you can observe K humans that were born before you for some
natural number K. The total final population of humans N is simply the number of heads
in the completed sequence of flips. By definition, as you observe K other humans, we must
have K < N . Therefore, the probability of the next coin flip being tails is the same as the
probability that you are the final human. In other words, letting NT be the event that
the k + 2nd (which is the next) coin flip is tails, then P(NT ) = P(N = K + 1). Hence,
questions 1 and 2 are related. A priori, n is distributed geometrically. The probability
of exactly n observers is the same as flipping n heads in a row followed by a tails. The
probability mass function of the distribution of N is P(N = n) = pn(p− 1) for n ∈ N. In
particular, because p < 1 we see Pr(n = 0) = 1− p > 0.
This system is memoryless in the sense that knowing that the population count N is at
least n0 for some fixed n0 provides no additional information on the distribution of N−n0.
More precisely, the distribution of N − n0, conditioned on N ≥ n0 is also geometrically
distributed with parameter p. Intuitively, knowing the first n flips tells us nothing about
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the subsequent flips. The distribution of the number of humans yet to be created after the
creation of the n0-th human is independent of n0.
Thus, the following fact seems self-evident: Each human created should believe that the
probability that the next coin flip is tails is 1 − p, regardless of their birth rank k, the
number of observed humans so far, and whether or not they’ve see the rest of the human
population or not. We refer to this property as the no-precognition property. In fact, given
the assumptions of the thought experiment, no human should have any information about
any future coin flip, and should continue to have credence p for it coming up heads. The
negation would be a form of precognition: at least one human being would be created with
some probabilistic information about the result of some future coin flip.
We now apply the definitions of SSA and SIA to determine the subjective probability
distribution of the number of future humans for each human as they are created. As
mentioned above, we will see that in the case of SSA, the probability of tails will actually
exceed 1− p. This is the famous Doomsday Argument applied to our toy universe. Under
SIA, the probability remains unchanged.
2.1. The SSA Case. Recall that under SSA, the probabilities of the underlying state
space are unchanged and the various indices within the population count n are equally
probable. Let νSSA be the probability measure on pairs (n, k) ∈ BBN × N corresponding
to SSA. For convenience, we will slightly abuse this notation and write νSSA(n, k) for the
credence that a human would have for the statement ”I am the k+ 1 human born out of a
total population of n humans” (the point density function for this distribution). According
to the definition of SSA, this is the unique probability distribution νSSA on pair of natural
numbers (n, k) such that
(1) P {k ≥ n} = 0
(2) Each index k compatible with a given population size n has the same credence. In
other words, νSSA(n, k0) = νSSA(n, k1) for k0, k1 < n.
(3) The marginal probability distribution of n under νSSA matches that of µ
Translating directly into an explicit formula for νSSA(n, k) is straightforward, just di-
viding the pdf of the geometric distribution on n equally across the n values of k that are
non-zero:
νSSA(n, k) =
{
0 if k ≥ n
pn−1(1−p)
n if k < n
One minor technical note: it would be tempting to write pn(1 − p)/n for the k < n
case above, however this is not a probability distribution because there is no k < n in case
n = 0. So, we need to normalize by the set of cases in which n > 0, which happens precisely
when the first flip is heads, i.e. p of the time. This is related to the “dicontinuity” noted
by Olum and referred to previously.
2.2. The SIA Case. We obtain different answers under SIA of course. We need to weight
the probability of each sequence of coin flips by the number of observers produced in each.
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If n+ 1 is the total number of coin flips, there are n heads followed by a single tail, which
results in n observers. This is a slightly more involved “global” computation but still easily
done. The probability distribution on n is proportional to n(1 − p)pn. This needs to be
normalized to have sum 1 over all n. Using basic calculus (recounted in Lemma 1 at the
end of this paper) we obtain
∞∑
n=0
npn(1− p) = (1− p) p
(1− p)2
=
p
1− p
So, µSIA(n) = n(1 − p)pn/(p/(1 − p)) = npn−1(1 − p)2. Hence, given k, n ∈ N with
k < n, the probability (under SIA) that we’re the k+1-th individual of n total observers is
νSIA(n, k) = µSIA(n)/n = p
n−1(1− p)2. Putting it all together, the point density function
for SIA is:
νSIA(n, k) =
{
0 if k ≥ n
pn−1(1− p)2 if k < n
2.3. Coin Flip Credences. Let us return to our original questions. Suppose we emerge
from the incubator an observer exactly k other humans that were created before us (so that
we’re the k + 1 human created). What is the probability that the next flip is tails? This
is equivalent to the probability that there are exactly n = k + 1 humans given that there
are at least k + 1 humans. In terms of our indexical space, ν(k + 1, k)/
∑∞
n=k+1 ν(n, k).
Under the assumptions of SSA we can compute this as follows:
PSSA(next tails|created as k + 1-th person) = νSSA(k + 1, k)∑∞
n=k+1 νSSA(n, k)
=
pk(1− p)/(k + 1)∑∞
n=k+1 p
n−1(1− p)/n
=
pk+1/(k + 1)∑∞
n=k+1 p
n/n

pk+1/(k + 1)∑∞
n=k+1 p
n/(k + 1)
=
1∑∞
m=0 1/p
m
= 1− p
So, in general, this is greater than and not equal to 1 − p. Thus SSA in this case
enabled precognition of the future coin flip. The probability of tails is strictly larger than
the intrinsic probability 1 − p of tails. Intuitively this does make sense given the stated
logic behind SSA. If we assume that we’re a random sample among the set of humans that
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actually exist, our index in this set does imply something about the total set of humans to
exist in the future, and hence the probability of the coin flip.
Conversely, for the SIA case we see
PSIA(next tails|created as k + 1-th person) = νSIA(k + 1, k)∑∞
n=k+1 νSIA(n, k)
=
pk(1− p2)∑∞
n=k+1 p
n−1(1− p2)
=
pk+1∑∞
n=k+1 p
k
=
1∑∞
m=0 p
m
= (1− p)
This is exactly the probability one would expect to see tails. Thus, there is no precognition
in this case.
To summarize: under the assumptions of SSA, the probability of tails for the next flip
for the n-th observer born is strictly greater than 1− p. However, for SIA, the probability
remains precisely 1− p. This suggests a deeply paradoxical, borderline paranormal, result
regarding SSA which we therefore reject.
This argument is in fact a mathematical generalization of the ”discontinuity” argument
against SSA mentioned in [6] (page number ?). Olum points out that in SSA, every world
with an observer consistent with our existence receives equal weight, while of course worlds
with no observers receive no weight. So, for example, the standard Incubator problem
gives probability 1/2 to both heads and tails as in both cases the world contains observers
whose experience is consistent with our experience. However, if one modifies Incubator
to give either 0 or 1 observer, we know the result of the coin flip with certainty. This
discontinuity seems dissatisfying in this particular case. In a sense, our argument shows
that this discontinuity in the extremes actually is a result of consistent precognition effects
that pervade many more regular cases.
A related thought experiment was proposed by Leslie himself in [5]. Called the Shooting-
Room Paradox, it proceeds as follows:
Thought Experiment 4 (Shooting-Room). First a batch of ten people are led into this
room. A pair of dice is thrown in front of their eyes. If a double six comes up they are all
shot. Otherwise they leave the room safely and a new batch, this one containing a hundred
people, is thrust in. The process continues, with each consecutive batch ten times larger
than the previous one, until there is a double six; whereupon the people in the room at that
time are shot and the experiment ends. (quoted from Bostrom).
Leslie’s observation is the paradox that, since the probability that any one generation
is killed is 1/36, this should be the probability of survival. However, after the fact on can
easily compute that approximately 90% of the people that are ever in the room are shot.
By this measure, it looks like the probability should be 90%.
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There have been a number of papers addressing this paradox (for example ??). Leslie
focuses on the appartent paradox caused by the disparity between the proportion of people
even in the room that are shot, versus the probability that a specific generation will be
shot virtue of the next die roll. This paradox has been thoroughly analyzed elsewhere,
and indeed one could reason analogously to the above analysis of Thought Experiment 3
(Geometric Incubator)to land on the correct result of 1/36. Indeed, the number of batches
in the room follows a geometric distribution, although the total number in room is different
because of the exponential growth of each batch size. To our knowledge, no one has used
this to observe that SIA would lead to precognition of the dice rolls, however.
3. Three versions of Skynet and Occam’s Razor
The Doomsday Argument can be compared to the German Tank Problem. In World
War II, the Allied forces wanted to estimate the production capacity of the Wehrmacht –
in particular how many tanks the Germans were producing. There were various methods
employed, such as traditional spying and reconnaissance. One of the most accurate was
a purely statistical method: analyzing the serial numbers on parts in captured German
tanks. The basic argument is that, if you capture a single randomly chosen tank and
the serial number on the tank is n, then one could estimate the total population of tanks
(which is roughly 2n). There are easy generalizations to the case of k > 1 tanks having
been captured.
The success of this method for estimating various quantities could be taken as a strong
argument in favor of SSA and the Doomsday argument. The underlying arguments in both
cases are similar. However, we argue that they are actually fundamentally different, as the
following thought experiment will show. We take this as another argument in favor of SIA
over SSA.
Thought Experiment 5 (Skynet). As in the Terminator film franchise, artificially in-
telligent robots (Terminators) are attempting to exterminate humanity, led by a central AI
Skynet. They are opposed by John Connor, a human. Skynet is capable of creating Ter-
minators using a machine, but the machine that creates them will irrevocably crash with
probability 1−p after right before each run (so the probability of a successful run it p). Ev-
erybody knows the value of p (both the Terminators and their human foes). The machine
has run and generated a number N of Terminators. The machine stamps each Terminator
with a sequential serial number. Consider the three scenarios:
(1) You are John Connor, and are told by a spy that there exists a Terminator with
serial number K.
(2) You are John Connor, and capture a Terminator uniformly sampled from among
the population of all Terminators. Its serial number is K.
(3) You awaken as a Terminator, and observe you have serial number K.
In each case, what are the credences you should assign to the total population of Termina-
tors?
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Item 3 is really the case of interest: as a Terminator, what should your credences be
conditioned on your index? This is analogous to being born a human being and aware of
your birth rank being k. The first two are shed light on the third, however.
In the first case, an outside observer (John Connor) learns only that there are at least
K Terminators. There is no other information or context provided. The Terminators
are generated by a process that results in a geometric distribution, and again using the
memoryless property of such distributions, the distribution of the number of Terminators
created after the K-th, conditioned on there being at least K, is again geometric with the
same parameter.
In the second case, the usual arguments from the German tank problem pertain, and we
gain more information about the resulting distribution. If we randomly manage to capture
the Terminator with serial number 109, it seems a lot less likely that there are only 2
more Terminators than if we capture the Terminator with serial number 5. The frequentist
approach yields a point estimate of the total population of Terminators of 2K, with a 95%
confidence interval of [K, 20K]. The Bayesian analysis does not yield a convergent mean,
but the distribution can be computed.
Note that capturing a uniformly distributed Terminator with serial number K entails
that there are at least K Terminators. So, more information is revealed to John Connor in
Item 2 than in Item 1. In general: knowing that a random variable N exceeds a particular
variable K is not the same as knowing a sampled value K from anuniform distribution
between 0 and N . The latter strictly entails the former.
Which one is most pertinent for the real case of interest, Item 3? The mathematical
argument described in the previous section for Geometric Incubator still pertains, which
favors Item 1 over Item 2. Claiming Item 2 is the right model for Item 3 would imply some
sort of precognition on the part of the Terminator.
A more universal principle is at work. In the comparison of Item 1 versus Item 2,
there is strictly more information revealed to John Connor. The information revealed
to the Terminator in Item 3 is compatible with both Item 1 and Item 2, but it’s not
at all clear why the Terminator would be justified in thinking of himself as having been
sampled uniformly as in the case of Item 2. It is certainly the case that we, as part of
the Copernican principle, think of ourselves as having each birth rank being equally likely.
While this does seems to suggest that we should regard our birth rank as having actually
been sampled uniformly from among the observers created, this is an illusion. Each birth
rank being equally likely is compatible with both SIA as well as SSA. Yet only SSA entails
the additional information, of the sort in Item 2, over and above SIA which is analogous
to Item 1. It’s not at all evident where this additional information would come from, from
the mere fact of having been an observer created with a particular birth rank. Therefore,
an argument for the most parsimonious model – “Occam’s Razor” – would favor SIA over
SSA.
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4. The General Case
We have seen that in the particular case of 3 that there is precognition under the as-
sumptions of SSA and no precognition in the case of SIA. In this section we show that, in
general, SIA is the only assignment of probabilities to the sampling space that eliminates
precognition.
4.1. Framework. We begin with a probability space (X,F , µ). We think of X as the set
of possible states of the world, with probabilities given by µ. To each state of the world
x ∈ X, there is a corresponding total population count N(x) ∈ N. N is a random variable
on X with values in the natural numbers N, equal to the total number of observers created
in the world-state x. Note, N(x) may be zero for some x, although we do require it to
be finite for almost all x. For some results below, will need to assume that N has finite
expected value as well.
This data, (X,F , µ,N), is meant to capture the “objective state” of the universe. By
objective state, we mean the observations about the universe that are independent of any
particular observer. An observer outside of the system should have credences and be able
to reason about these states. We will refer to the observers inside the system as “internal
observers” and hypothetical observers outside the system as “external observers”. For
example, in Incubator, the humans being incubated are internal observers and we (or the
machine) would be external observers. External observers share the credences given by µ.
These external observers might not actually exist in any sense, but rather be a convenient
fiction.
Observers within the system (internal observers) should also be able to reason about the
objective state of the universe (in other words, assign credences to events such as x ∈ S for
some S ∈ F). The states make no reference to any observer specific indexical information
(for example, statements like “I am the k-th observer created” cannot be referenced by
subset of X) and any two rational observers with identical information (whether in or
outside the system) would have the same credences on X.
We now introduce a formalism that does allow for reference to internal-observer specific
indexical information. The indexical sampling space for X is Y = {(x, k) ∈ X × N|k <
N(x)}. Intuitively, an element of Y corresponds to a particular internal observer in a
particular possible world. The element (x, k) ∈ Y is thought of as referring to the (k+ 1)-
st observer created in the world corresponding to x, in which there are N(x) observers,
and we will refer to these elements as observer-states. As before, the index k runs from
0 to N(x) − 1 for notational convenience. In contrast to X, an element of Y picks out a
particular observer and hence is subjective. Two internal observers would have different
credences for subsets of Y , precisely because the true, underlying state corresponding to
those two observers is actually different (they share the same first coordinate in X, but
two different values in {0, . . . , N(x)− 1} for the second coordinate).
Let piX : Y → X be the projection onto the first element. Then N ◦ piX is a random
variable from Y to N, which we will also write as simply N . The projection onto the second
coordinate K : Y → N is also a N-valued random variable. Formally, N(x, k) = N(x) and
K(n, k) = k. As mentioned above, 0 ≤ K < N everywhere on Y .
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In a sense, piX and K perform complementary functions. The first, piX , “forgets” all
observer-dependent structure and retains only the observer-independent state. Conversely,
K only retains the indexical information corresponding to an observer.
We will want to consider events on X as events on Y as well. This will enable us to
translate between external and internal observers. Internal observers can refer to certain
events, namely ones that include indexical information such as “I am observer number 10
created”, but every event that an external observer can refer to also makes sense from the
perspective of an internal observer. We do this simply by taking the pre-image of the event
under the map piX . For convenience we notate this by S˜ = pi
−1
X (S) for S ∈ F .
We also define subsets of X and Y by the number and index of observers. The first, Xn is
the set of world-states with n observers, and Yn,k is the set of k-th indexed observer-states
in worlds with n observers.
Xn := N
−1(n)
= {x ∈ X|N(x) = n}
Yk,n := X˜n ∩K−1(k)
= {(x, j) ∈ Y |N(x) = n and k = j}
We want to characterize probability distributions ν on Y that capture the intuitive
notion of anthropic sampling. The measure ν would be defined on the σ-algebra G given
by the restriction of the product σ-algebra on X × N, where N has the discrete σ-algebra
(i.e. the power set σ-algebra, in which every subset of N is measurable). Both projections
piX and K are measurable, hence K and N are random variables on Y .
The probability measure ν should capture the credences of an event (i.e. subset S ⊂ Y )
that a rational observer would have, knowing the probability distribution µ on X and the
total population count N .
Definiton 3 (Anthropic Sampling Distrubition ν). For any (measurable) subset S of Y
(i.e. S ∈ G), ν(S) is the credence that an rational internal observer give to the statement
that “The world is in state x ∈ X and I am observer number k ∈ N for some (x, k) ∈
S”, immediately after being created, knowing the probability distribution of µ on X and
population count random variable N , but prior to any other knowledge being imparted.
The fundamental problem of anthropic reasoning in our language is: starting with
(X,F , µ,N) as above, consider the indexical sampling space Y a defined above,hat is
the most appropriate probability measure ν to put on Y to reflect the credences of an
observer y who finds him/herself in a world x sampled from X according to distribution µ
with population N(x). Is this even a well-defined, unique probability distribution?
Merely being a probability distribution on Y puts some constraints on ν, but more is
needed to fully characterize and capture the notion of Anthropic sampling. The Copernican
Principle as defined above (Defintion 2) is one obvious constraint. Restating it formally
for this more general framework:
Definiton 4 (Copernican Principle). For all k0 < n0 ∈ N and S ∈ F with N(S) = n0 (N
is constant on S with value n0), ν(K = k0|S˜) = 1/n0.
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In other words: knowing that there are precisely n0 observers (and perhaps some addi-
tional information that refers only to the objective state of the world but nothing referring
to our birth rank), then our birth rank is distributed uniformly between 0 and n0 − 1.
The Self-Sampling Assumption and Self-Indication Assumption that we discussed earlier
both purport to answer this question. We translate them into this new formalism as follows:
Definiton 5 (Formal Self-Sampling Assumption). Let ν be a measure on (Y,G) that sat-
isfies the Copernican Principle. The (Formal) Self-Sampling Assumption for ν states that
the ν-measure of a set of world-states is the same as the µ-measure, conditioned on there
being some observers at all:
νSSA(S˜) = µ(S|N > 0)
Definiton 6 (Formal Self-Indication Assumption). Let ν be a measure on (Y,G) that
satisfies the Copernican Principle. The (Formal) Self-Indication Assumption states that
the ν-measure of a set of world-states is the µ-measure weighted by the number of observers
in that state, normalized to be a probability measure by the expected number of observers:
νSIA(S˜) =
∫
S N(x)dµ(x)∫
X N(x)dµ(x)
Note that the normalization factor needed in the definition of νSIA to make it a proba-
bility measure is simply the expected number of observers, which we assume is finite.
We will posit another constraint on ν that, combined with the Copernican Principle, will
fully characterize ν. Arguing in a similar manner as in the case of Geometric Incubator,
that the ”Self-indication assumption” is the only assignment of credences on Y that satisfies
this both the Copernican Principle and this additional property.
What is missing beyond the Copernican Principle and the construction of Y itself (which
guarantees consistency and that N and K are random variables – are measurable – on Y )
is some condition linking µ (a measure on X) and ν (a measure on Y ). The credence of
an internal observer ought to be linked to the credence of an external observer when they
share “similar information”. How can we formalize this intuition? What does it mean for
an internal and external observer to have “similar” information?
We formalize this notion as follows: Internal observers should have credences identical
to those an external observer would have who learns that the given internal observer has
been created (or at least one with that same birth rank has been created). This can be
translated into the following condition relating µ and ν:
Definiton 7 (No-Precognition Principle). For every event S ∈ F (i.e. referring only to
external world-states in X) and natural number k, the credence that an internal observer
gives to S˜ knowing only that they are observer number k + 1 is the same as the credence
that an external observer gives to S knowing only that there are more than k observers.
Formally: for all S ∈ F and k0 ∈ N, ν(S˜|K = k0) = µ(S|N > k0).
Why do we refer to this as “no-precognition”? Because if these credences do not agree,
then the internal observer gains some additional knowledge about the objective state of the
world (reflected in the change in probability measure) beyond that of the external observer
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merely by virtue of the fact that THEY (as opposed to someone else) is the k-th internal
observer created. This could be literal “pre-cognition” in the sense of foreknowledge, or
(if we regard the events as having been determined already) some sort of “extra-sensory
perception”. Either way, the internal observer has some unexplained, non-natural insight
into which x ∈ X corresponds to their universe. This is merely a generalization of the
observation we made before in Geometric Incubator, where the subjective credence of the
next coin flip for the internal observer differs from the credence assigned by the objective
observer.
Theorem 1. Let (X,F , µ) be a probability space and N : X → N be a random variable as
described above. Let λ be the expected population count: λ = EX [N ]. Construct the index-
ical sampling space and associated σ-algebra G as above. Consider a probability measure ν
on (Y,G). The following are equivalent:
(1) Both the No-Precognition Principle (Definition 7) and Copernican Principle (Def-
inition 4) hold for ν.
(2) For all S ∈ F and k0, n0 ∈ N with N(S) = {n0} > k0, ν(S × {k0}) = µ(S)/λ
(3) For all T ∈ G, ν(T ) = ∑∞k=0 µ({x ∈ X|(x, k) ∈ T})/λ.
(4) ν is the product measure on X × N (using the counting measure on N) restricted
to Y and normalized to have total measure 1 (in other words, to be a probability
measure). The normalizing factor is 1/λ.
(5) ν satisfies the Self-Indication Assumption (Definiton 6).
Proof. The hardest part is to see (1) ⇐⇒ (2). Assume that ν satisfies the Copernican
principle, as that is part of the assumption in both (1) and (2).
Let S, n0, k0 be given as in (ii) and assume that the No-Precognition Condition holds for
ν. We expand both sides of the “no-precogniton” equation. First the left hand side, using
the Copernican principle at the second to last equation:
ν(S˜|K = k0) = ν(S˜ ∧ (K = k0))
ν(K = k0)
=
ν(S × {k0})∑∞
n=0 ν((K = k0) ∧ (N = n))
=
ν(S × {k0})∑∞
n=0 ν(K = k0|N = n)ν(N = n)
=
ν(S × {k0})∑∞
n=k0+1
ν(N = n)/n
Similarly, for the right hand side we obtain:
µ(S|N > k0) = µ(S)∑∞
n=k0+1
µ(N = n)
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Equating both expressions, in order to show (2) it will suffice to prove that:
∞∑
n=k0+1
µ(N = n) = EX [N ] ·
∞∑
n=k0+1
ν(N = n)/n
holds assuming the No-Precognition condition holds.
To see that, we apply the no-precognition property again, this time to S = {N = k0+1}:
ν(N = k0 + 1|K = k0) = µ(N = k0 + 1|N > k0)
=
µ((N = k0 + 1) ∧ (N > k0))
µ(N > k0)
=
µ(N = k0 + 1)∑∞
n=k0+1
µ(N = n)
which is also:
ν(N = k0 + 1|K = k0) = ν((N = k0 + 1) ∧ (K = k0))
ν(K = k0)
=
ν((N = k0 + 1) ∧ (K = k0))∑∞
n=k0+1
ν((N = n) ∧ (K = k0))
=
ν(N = k0 + 1)/(k0 + 1)∑∞
n=k0+1
ν(N = n)/n
Hence:
ν(N = k0 + 1)/(k0 + 1)∑∞
n=k0+1
ν(N = n)/n
=
µ(N = k0 + 1)∑∞
n=k0+1
µ(N = n)
Applying Lemma 2 (with an = ν(N = n)/n and bn = µ(N = n)) we conclude ν(N =
k0 + 1)/(k0 + 1) = γ · µ(N = k0 + 1) for all k0 for some γ. In other words, ν(N = n) =
γnµ(N = n) for all n ∈ N (we get the n = 0 case because obviously ν(N = 0) is 0 – there
are no observers in worlds with N = 0, therefore the probability that an observer is in such
a world is 0). Summing and taking the ratio, we see
γ =
∑∞
n=0 ν(N = n)∑∞
n=0 nµ(N = n)
= 1/EX [N ]
Hence (2) holds.
To see that (2) implies (1), we can essentially just work the same computation in re-
verse. Assume (2). Using the same expansion of the left and right hand sides of the
No-Precognition equation as before:
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µ(S|N > k0) = µ(S)∑∞
n=k0+1
µ(N = n)
ν(S˜|K = k0) = ν(S × {k0})∑∞
n=k0+1
ν(N = n)/n
Thus, it suffices to prove that
ν(S × {k0}) =
∑∞
n=k0+1
ν(N = n)/n∑∞
n=k0+1
µ(N = n)
µ(S)
Applying (2) this reduces to
λ =
∑∞
n=k0+1
ν(N = n)/n∑∞
n=k0+1
µ(N = n)
To see this, we apply (2) again to the event {N = n} so that for each k < n we have
ν((N = n) ∧ (K = k)) = µ(N = n)/λ. Adding up the n disjoint cases as k runs over
{0, . . . , n− 1} we obtain ν(N = n) = nµ(N = n)/λ. Diving both sides by n and summing
over n > k0 we obtain our result.
(2) ⇐⇒ (3): To see =⇒ , decompose T ∈ G into slices of the form Tn,k = T ∩ Yn,k.
Using (2) we compute the ν-measure of slice and the sum using countable additivity. For
the other direction, (2) is just a special case of (3).
(3) ⇐⇒ (4): This is the definition of product measure.
(3) ⇐⇒ (5): This is the definition of the Self-Indication Assumption.

5. The Presumptuous Philosopher Redux
We’ve seen that SSA entails precognition in the case of the geometric incubator, while
SIA does not. However, essentially a similar criticism has been leveled against SIA in the
past: the presumptuous philosopher paradox referred to above (Thought Experiment 2).
By weighing the probability of possible world-states by the number of internal observers,
it seems to create information from nothing. For instance, wouldn’t SIA force us to believe
our universe has infinity many observers?
How to resolve this apparent paradox? We would argue the issue is with an inherent
ambiguity in the statement of the problem. Consider the following events and specified
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conditional probabilities from the statement of the Presumptuous Philosopher:
T1 = There are a total of a trillion trillion (1024) observers
T2 = There are a total of a trillion trillion trillion (1036) observers
ME = I exist, and am observer number 60 billion
E = All of experimental and theoretical physics considered by the scientist
pr{T1|E} = 0.5
pr{T2|E} = 0.5
Translated it our language: X = T1 ∪ T2, N(T1) = 1024, N(T2) = 1036 (meaning that
N is constant on each of these subsets of X), and K = 60 · 109.
There are multiple interpretations of the probabilities given in the problem statement.
Do we consider these events as being events on some external probability space like (X,µ)
in our framework above, or should they be considered as events on the indexical sampling
space Y equipped with the only ν that fits our No-Precognition assumption? Essentially,
does the physics E that determines that the two outcomes are equally likely already account
for our observation ME, or does it not?
In the first case, in which the evidence E does include the observation that we are among
the first trillion trillion observers, further conditioning on this fact yields nothing. So, there
is no Nobel prize awaiting the philosopher and the probabilities remain the same.
In the second case, with E regarded as an event in the underlying, objective space X, we
do in fact get a shift of probabilities. The computation exactly matches Bostrom’s original
computation.
However, this is assuming that the physicists somehow computed some completely ob-
jective a priori probability that assigns equal weights to these very different populations of
observers. Recall the proper interpretation of the indexical information contained in ME
from Definition 3 above. The evidence in ME is the most concrete, immediate evidence
we have available to us. However, the second case asks us to discard this, and is derived
as if we are standing apart from the system. Our thesis is that all reasoning must occur as
probabilities on Y , not on X. Otherwise, we will be vulnerable to belief in precognition as
described above.
Another way of thinking of the same issue: suppose we were given E but not our birth
rank K. Assume that, in the absence of knowing our birth rank, the evidence E is still
such that we consider T1 and T2 equally credible. Then, through advancements in the
fields of anthropology and archeology, we discover ME, that our birth rank is 60 · 109. In
this case, it is SSA that would dictate that the probabilities should shift and more heavily
weight T1 (this is simply The Doomsday Argument). It seems just as unlikely for this shift
to occur, as the prior one.
6. Empirical Doomsday
We have argued above in favor of SIA over SSA. Does this entirely eliminate the Dooms-
day Argument? While it does appear to eliminate the Carter-Leslie (and Gott) style
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Doomsday Argument, an empirically grounded Doomsday Argument can be made in this
framework. This new Doomsday Argument is intuitively plausible, as it is based on spe-
cific observational evidence about the world and population of observers. The specifics
rely on a number of modeling assumptions about statistical distributions of life in the uni-
verse. While the true distributions are presumably analytically intractable and impossible
to estimate reliably, we can glean some general observations using toy models.
The fundamental idea is that each class of observer would have a total population
throughout its history sampled from some probability distribution, which itself unknown.
By observing one’s population rank, and observer can make inferences about this unknown
parameter, and hence the distribution of the total population.
For example, consider a model of the total population distributed according to a geo-
metric distribution (again, just as in Geometric Incubator), n Geom(p) for some p ∈ (0, 1).
The parameter p itself is unknown, but is distributed according to some other probability
distribution. Then, being born at some rank k in the history of the life form – in other
works, observing that n ≥ k – enables us to make some inferences about p. Then, these
inferences in turn enable further inferences about the ultimate size of the population n.
For example, suppose p is distributed uniformly in the interval (0, 1) and we observe our
birth rank is k. From the definition of geometric distribution:
P [n ≥ k|p] = pk(1)
The unconditional probability that n ≥ k is then∫ 1
0
pkdp =
pk+1
(k + 1)
∣∣∣∣1
p=0
= 1/(k + 1)
Thus, if we let f(p|n ≥ k) be the pdf of p after making this observation, and f(p) =
1(0,1)(p) the pdf of the uniform distribution for p ∈ (0, 1), we find:
f(p|n ≥ k) = P [n ≥ k|p]
P [n ≥ k] f(p)(2)
= (k + 1)pk(3)
Thus, the probability that we will see at least m more members of our population is
P [n ≥ k +m|n ≥ k] =
∫ 1
0
pm(k + 1)pkdp(4)
=
k + 1
m+ k + 1
(5)
As k →∞, this probability approaches 1. Hence, if we’ve already observed a very large
population, we may then suppose that it’s likely that a large number of future population
members are coming.
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As an aside, we should note that in this model the total population has infinite mean.
We have:
E [n] =
∫ 1
0
E [n|p] dp
=
∫ 1
0
p
1− pdp
=
∫ 1
0
1
1− p −
1− p
1− pdp
= ln(1− p)− 1|10
which does not converge. This peculiar property of this particular distribution is not
important for the argument, and many distributions with finite moments would work just as
well. For example, the same results hold if we instead model p as being sampled uniformly
from the interval (0, q) for some fixed q < 1.
7. Mathematical Lemmas
Lemma 1. Let p ∈ (0, 1). Then
∞∑
k=0
pk =
1
1− p
∞∑
k=n
pk =
pn
1− p
∞∑
k=n
kpk =
n(1− p)pn + pn+1
(1− p)2
Proof. The first two are simply geometric sequences. For the third, let x =
∑∞
k=n kp
k.
(1− p)x =
∞∑
k=n
kpk −
∞∑
k=n
kpk+1
= npn +
∞∑
k=n+1
kpk −
∞∑
k=n+1
(k − 1)pk
= npn +
∞∑
k=n+1
pk
= npn +
pn+1
1− p
=
n(1− p)pn + pn+1
1− p
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using 6 above. Diving both sides by 1− p yields
x =
n(1− p)pn + pn+1
(1− p)2

Lemma 2. Let an, bn for n ∈ N be sequences such that an ≥ 0 and bn ≥ 0 for all n ∈ N
and with convergent sums. Assume further that for every n
an
( ∞∑
m=n
bm
)
= bn
( ∞∑
m=n
am
)
Then the two sequences are proportional: (
∑∞
m=0 bm) · an = (
∑∞
m=0 am) · bn for all n. In
particular if either sequence is not always zero, then the other is also not always zero and
an = λbn where
λ =
∑∞
n=0 an∑∞
n=0 bn
The converse is also true: if the sequences are proportional, then the equality holds for all
n.
Proof. We use induction on n. Let n ∈ N be given, and assume the lemma holds for all
n′ < n. If
∑∞
m=n bm = 0 then bm = 0 for all m > n, which implies am = 0 for all m > n
as well and the lemma holds for n. So, we may assume
∑∞
m=n bm > 0. Not further than if
bn = 0, then an = bn (
∑∞
m=n am) / (
∑∞
m=n bm) = 0 and so the lemma holds for n as well.
Hence, we may assume bn > 0. Then:
an
bn
=
∑∞
m=n am∑∞
m=n bm
=
∑∞
m=0 am −
∑n−1
m=0 am∑∞
m=0 bm −
∑n−1
m=0 bm
=
λ
∑∞
m=0 bm −
∑n−1
m=0 λbm∑∞
m=0 bm −
∑n−1
m=0 bm
= λ
The converse, that if the sequences are proportional then the partial sums are as well,
is easy to see.

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